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regions’ authority. The separation of executive, legislative, and judicial powers can help ensure that one
interest does not dominate others, as can the incorporation of regional actors at the federal level through,
for example, regional representation in the legislature
or power sharing in the executive.
By popular safeguards, Bednar refers to the
power of the people to ‘‘patrol the boundaries of
federal and state authorities’’ (110) through elections,
punishing politicians that break the rules. Political
safeguards, in contrast, place the responsibility for
federal robustness on politicians. Building on Filippov
et al. (2004), Bednar suggests that the political party
system can bind politicians at different levels of
government together, creating both a sense of sympathy and incentives for these politicians to cooperate
and respect the internal boundaries of the federation.
Finally, judicial safeguards refer to how courts monitor
the distribution of powers within the federation and
create common understanding by interpreting constitutional rules.
No safeguard is by itself sufficient for ensuring
federal robustness, but combined they complement
and reinforce one another. For example, while structural safeguards may prevent the federal government
from encroaching on regional governments’ jurisdictions, they do not prevent regional governments from
disrespecting the distribution of authority. The political safeguards can step in and fill that gap: in a party
system where politicians at different levels depend on
one another for staying in power, both federal and
regional-level politicians have incentives to respect
the boundaries. Indeed because each institutional
safeguard has a different threshold and is unable to
enforce perfect compliance, they manage to create a
balance of compliance and adaptation, as ‘‘governments can experiment around the edges of the
distribution of authority at little cost, and the system
as a whole may learn from what they find’’ (184).
Bednar emphasizes that the book ‘‘will not offer
an ideal design—there is no ‘perfect’ constitution in
an appendix—but it does offer design principles’’
(4). The premise of the book is that the robustness
of a federation depends on institutional context—
not just one institution, but several. In the conclusion, it becomes clear that societal context matters as well: ‘‘Language differences, differences in
legal code, and even population settlement history
may cause particular safeguards to be more or less
capable’’ (215). This is an important point, especially as federalism is often proposed as a means to
manage heterogeneous societies (think of recent
debates about federalism in Iraq). It is worth asking
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how such community traits influence the institutional safeguards. Bednar’s aim is not to test how the
safeguards’ effects may be conditional on noninstitutional variables, but she carefully discusses the
promises and perils of each safeguard. For instance,
she notes the possible adverse (and unintended)
consequence of political safeguards in a heterogeneous
society. Indeed, mutual dependence between federal
and regional-level political parties can contribute to
minority group exploitation by allowing nondemocratic pockets to exist: ‘‘Political safeguards fail completely to guard against these opportunistic enclaves;
in fact, it is the mutual dependence, the key mechanism of the political safeguard, that makes these
enclaves possible’’ (118, fn. 27). While Bednar convincingly underscores the importance of auxiliary
institutions, our understanding of federalism can
further benefit from theorizing and testing the ways
in which the robustness of federations may also
depend on societal context.
Kristin M. Bakke, Leiden University
Treaty Politics and the Rise of Executive Agreements:
International Commitments in a System of Shared
Powers. By Glen S. Kurtz and Jeffrey S. Peake.
(Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press,
2009.)
doi:10.1017/S0022381609991010
This provocative and persuasive book is a direct
challenge to the growing body of literature in the field
of presidency studies that argues for a more unilateralist or direct action approach to the understanding
of presidential power. The authors examine the
presidency from a more Neustadtian perspective
and argue that a more nuanced and political understanding of presidential power is in order.
The authors begin with the accepted wisdom
regarding why presidents have resorted to the use of
executive agreements over treaties in reaching international agreements, arguing that ‘‘a strong conventional
wisdom had emerged: modern presidents routinely
evaded Congress (and the requirements set forth in the
Constitution) by using executive agreements instead of
treaties’’ (ix). Presidents use executive agreements
‘‘strategically’’ in an effort to bypass Congress and
govern alone, legislating unilaterally. This ‘‘evasion
hypothesis’’ predominates the literature, but is it true?
The evasion hypothesis is one of the legs upon which
the unilateral approach stands. If untrue, the foundation
of the unilateralist approach is severely weakened. To the
extent that presidents can and do act as independent
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policy makers, the direct action argument is strengthened. As the authors note, the unilateral approach posits
that ‘‘With the rise of executive agreements, modern
presidents appear to have grabbed the treaty power,
intended by the framers to be shared with the Senate, and
made it their own, thus diminishing an important check
on executive power and thwarting the constitutional
principle of shared power’’ (9).
Kurtz and Peake review the literature on executive
agreements and treaties, a literature that on the surface
seems to support the unilateral theory of presidential
power. But they look more closely at how presidents
behave, how Senators and their staffers view the
relationship, and how bureaucrats in the State Department deal with the issue. By delving deeper into the
problem, the authors see a much more complex and
interdependent set of forces at work. What may appear
true on the surface yields to a more nuanced understanding when studied more closely.
The authors offer their own theoretical framework for understanding this problem. As they write,
‘‘our framework proceeds from the notion that while
treaties and executive agreements are . . . legally interchangeable, they are not politically interchangeable . . . their use has important political ramifications
that presidents are likely to consider.’’ They see ‘‘the
two institutions as interdependent parts of an adaptive system that must together forge and implement
internationally binding agreements with a vast array
of nations and international organizations, all the
while maintaining the constitutional and political
prerogatives of shared power’’ (10). In the end, they
see the president and Congress striking ‘‘an institutional bargain grounded in requirements for efficiency that are demanded in modern realities’’ (10).
This work then goes about demonstrating that the
theoretical framework is indeed plausible. And the
authors make a persuasive case, especially when they
introduce us to congressional staffers and state department bureaucrats who engage day-to-day in the give
and take process of politics on the international stage.
The realities the authors speak of are the demands for swift action on the international front
(treaty approval is often a long, grueling process) and
the inherently slow nature of how Congress does its
business. In a way, Congress, unable to keep up with
the presidency (recall Samuel Huntington’s ‘‘adaptation crisis’’ of Congress), delegates a great deal to the
executive. It reserves the ‘‘right’’ to block treaties or
object to executive agreements, yet it is not institutionally disposed to the long and hard work on a dayto-day basis. Presidents recognize this and push only
so far as not to wake the sleeping dog.
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Does this recognition by Congress support the
authors’ Neustadtian view or is it a more nuanced
version of unilateralism? Here, a dialogue between
the two competing schools would be most valuable. Is
Congress adapting to modern realities and institutional weaknesses, or is it serving as an enabler of its
own decline? To what extent are presidents limited by
Congress in their strategic calculations? Is Congress a
mere annoyance, like a fly to be squatted then
ignored, or does Congress, as the authors suggest,
stand as a mighty giant waiting for a president to go
too far, when it will rise up and crush him?
Kurtz and Peake see a significant if not a robust
role for Congress in this, writing that ‘‘Rather than
painting the Congress as weak and ineffectual, our
theory suggests that both the Senate and the House
clearly benefit from the use of executive agreements’’
and that ‘‘so long as presidents do not abuse the
process on consequential agreements, the Senate is a
willing partner’’ (193). And yet, one is left with the
gnawing suspicion that Congress is merely making
the best of victim status here.
The authors conclude by suggesting that ‘‘theories of presidential power, which have leaned toward
unilateral persuasion in recent years, need to swing
back somewhat to incorporate the principle of shared
power’’ (197) and that ‘‘Based on the results of this
study and a careful reading of the unilateral perspective, we believe that the principle of shared power
needs to be more explicitly brought back into the
fold. While unilateral action can indeed be prevalent,
it often stems from and is bounded by shared power’’
(198).
One can only hope that this fine and challenging
book starts an argument, or at least a dialogue, about
presidential power in a post-Bush era. It merits the
attention of presidency and congressional scholars,
and those interested in the interaction of America’s
political institutions.
Michael A. Genovese, Loyola Marymount University
Out of Reach: Place, Poverty, and the New American
Welfare State. By Scott W. Allard. (Yale University
Press, 2009.)
doi:10.1017/S0022381609991022
Today’s American safety net looks vastly different
than it did 30—or even 15— years ago. Most notably,
the provision of cash assistance to individuals in need
has shrunk to a tiny portion of the aid dispensed in
this country. The safety net of today is one of services:
job training, mental health services, vocational

